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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This book discusses different topics from phenomenology to philosophy of 
language; the topics discussed belong to different areas of philosophy even if  it is 
possible to find a fil rouge that enables the reader to achieve a transversal point of 
view. 
If we consider the idea of a basic antireductionism common to the topics of this 
book, it can be seen apparently that a diversity of themes with which we are 
concerned disappears in favor of an homogeneity of sense which pervades the 
arguments treated. 
An important achievement of these essays is the weakening of the idea of the 
immediacy of knowledge: in Harvey’s and Hintikkas’ interpretation of Husserl’s 
thought, the opposition to the immediacy of knowledge rests on the assumption 
that there would be a mutual infiltration between the precategorial (sensible) and 
the categorial (rational) levels of experience so that the idea of a founding stratum 
of every possible experience could lose sense; Hintikka’s and Harvey’s suggestion 
is that we ought to index, through “hinge-concepts”, the direction of the 
phenomenological analysis as a movement from the predicative level to a 
“rationally reconstructed” prepredicative one.  
In the essay “Thing and Space in Husserl”, the task of  the theoretical reason is to 
show how the things conceived by the scientific and the natural thinking would be 
by-products of a construction upon the unitary and meaningful world of everyday 
experience: in this sense objective space is constituted through the concatenation 
of places available to me in my kinesthetically felt “near-sphere”.  
Sellars, from his point of view, denies that there would be a basic level at which 
knowledge would be a matter of an immediate encounter with its object, as if 
immediate knowledge were not inferred from any other knowledge. The major 
point of Sellars’ view is the idea that numerous tensions are hidden in sense-
datum theories, loyal to the myth of the Given,  that can be characterized in these 
terms: 
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a) knowledge of facts versus knowledge of particulars; 
b) learned versus unlearned cognitive capacities; 
c) factualism about knowledge versus non-naturalism about knowledge; 
d) inner episodes as causal intermediaries of empirical knowledge versus 
inner episodes as epistemic intermediaries of empirical knowledge.  
Sellars fashions an account of sensation which construes this both instrumentally 
and non epistemically: sensations are neither the direct objects of knowledge, nor 
are they primordial knowings; they would belong to the causal order rather than 
to the cognitive one . 
Sensations mediate and guide our perceptual knowledge of the world, even if this 
knowledge is not a second-class knowing  inferred i.e. from the knowledge of 
items like color and sounds: our knowledge of the world is direct but mediated. 
For this reason sensations cannot be considered like knowings: they are states of 
perceivers that are non epistemic in character and depending on external causes; 
sensations are a necessary condition of the intentional order, even if they do not 
belong to this order. 
Wittgenstein, on his part, retains that the many-dimensional character of colour 
concepts  makes them ineffable, so that every attempt goes wrong to reduce them 
to a more primitive ostensive game: colour concepts or colour words have a 
certain degree of vagueness, so that it results very difficult to achieve some 
sharpness or to draw boundaries; this task belongs to logic, not to the everyday 
language.   
If we  try to face the language game played by colour words, we cannot recur to 
“pen-and-ink” conceptual schemes even if some, as it were, “regularities”, some 
“unassailable”  truths (e.g. the octahedron frame) must be presupposed to match 
colour issues. In our attempt to describe uses of colour-words, we must admit that 
1) some sentences are often used on the borderline between logic and the 
empirical; 2)  in philosophy it is not enough in every case to say something about 
an object, but also to learn how to speak about it. 
What characterizes the following essays is also a certain degree of 
antireductionism and a mitigated use of an a priori way of looking to 
phenomenological or linguistic questions: in the case of the study on the 
prepredicative and the predicative layers of our experience of the world, the 
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antireductionist option is testified by the philosophical belief that the silent layer 
of the prepredicative experience has not the privilege of a full and immediate 
contact with reality, since every encounter of the world is mediated by culture, 
language, theoretical and practical habits which jeopardize the task of arriving at 
the “immediacy” of  the experience; the a priori structures which  preside over the 
experience of the world have an hermeneutical load due to the fact that  every 
experience is already saturated with anticipations which are permeated by a 
certain degree of typical familiarity  and precognizance. 
In the essay “Thing and space in Husserl” the antireductionist line is showed by 
the importance of the Body, the lived body,  for the constitution of the three-
dimensional space, since thanks to my Body I am at the center of things and 
everything in my immediate surrounding is given a location. Husserl posits 
between the lived body and the objective space a Sehraum, a purely visual space, 
in order to make the objective space a lived space: the visual space has its own 
system of places (Ortssystem) which are never given without kinesthetic 
motivations which here, together with the pre-empirical qualities of things (size, 
color and so on), function as a priori constraints on our apprehension of the world. 
As regards Sellars the antireductionist character of his thought would rest in a way 
of approaching the philosophical enterprise which can be defined holistic: 
knowledge cannot be conceived as an accurate representing, the “mirror of 
nature”, since such accuracy would require a theory of privileged representations 
which cannot be approved; justification is not a matter of a special relation 
between ideas and objects, but of conversation, of social practice. The American 
philosopher maintains traces of a priori boundaries of our world experience in the 
sense of conceptual schemes, for example the manifest or the scientific images of 
the world, even if these patterns or set of categories we operate with are 
potentially dynamic, changing under the impact of both experience and reflection: 
in this sense he seems to be more Hegelian than Kantian. 
In the essay on Wittgenstein, the antireductionist flavor of his thought manifests 
itself in the idea that in order to get clear the idea about the meaning of a term like 
“colour”, one does not have to find the common element present in all its 
applications, because such an approach would dismiss as irrelevant the concrete 
cases. Questions regarding the use of the term “colour” are very important for 
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they help clearing up relevant problems concerning, i.e., the relation between 
logic and experience, or language and perception. Such questions are so strongly 
linked that a reductionist approach is not able to tackle them. 
